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Abstract 
In 2004, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index ranks Uruguay at 28, 
seven positions higher than in 2001, scores changed from 5.1 to 6.2 (a higher score means 
less perceived corruption). In addition, there were no relevant corruption scandals in that 
period. Hence, we should ask: what are the foundations of corruption perception? We 
assess this at the micro-level. Our dataset is the module on Citizenship of the International 
Social Survey Program (that was carried out in 2004) and we estimate ordered a probit 
model. 
 
We find that some economic variables are significant. In particular we show that those who 
work in private enterprises tend to perceive higher levels of corruption as do unemployed 
people. Hence those who may be on the supply side of the bribe “market” perceive a 
higher level of corruption than those on the demand side (civil servants). In addition, our 
main contribution to the existence literature is showing that socio-demographic variables 
play a relevant role. We show that those who belong to the youngest group, who took, at 
least, high school studies and those who belong to a religious group are more likely to 
perceive a higher level of corruption. 
 
Key words: corruption, public opinion, microeconomic behavior, ISSP, Uruguay. 
JEL Classification: D70, K42. 
 
Resumen 
En el año 2004, Uruguay se ubicaba en el puesto 28 del Índice de Percepción de 
Corrupción de Transparencia Internacional, siete posiciones más arriba del puesto 
alcanzado en el año 2001. La puntuación de Uruguay, pasó de 5.1 a 6.2 (un puntaje más 
alto implica un menor nivel de corrupción percibido). Además, en esos años no se 
registraron continuos o generalizados problemas de corrupción en el país. Dada esta 
estabilidad, surge la siguiente interrogante: ¿cuáles son los determinantes de la percepción 
de corrupción? Para responder esta pregunta a nivel micro, se utilizó la base de datos de la 
red International Social Survey Program (del año 2004) y se estimaron modelos probit. 
 
Se concluye que las características económicas son relevantes para determinar el nivel 
individual de corrupción percibido. En particular, aquellos que trabajan en el sector 
privado tienden a percibir mayores niveles de corrupción al igual que los desempleados. 
Por lo tanto, en aquellos individuos que se encuentran del lado de la oferta en el “mercado 
de coimas”, la percepción de corrupción es mayor que la de aquellos que se encuentran del 
lado de la demanda (funcionarios públicos). Por otro lado, la contribución más relevante 
del trabajo, es demostrar que las características socio-demográficas también juegan un rol 
relevantes. Se encuentra que los más jóvenes, los más educados y aquellos que pertenecen 
a un grupo religioso, son los grupos que tienden a percibir mayores niveles de corrupción. 
 
Palabras clave: corrupción, opinión pública, comportamiento microeconómico, ISSP, 
Uruguay. 
Clasificación JEL: D70, K42.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The concept of corruption is employed in several areas and its connotations vary widely 
depending not only on societies but also on people. Since the definition of corruption 
depends on social and cultural factors, the  s o m e  i s  t r u e  f o r  corruption perception. 
Therefore, we should ask: 1) what are the individual characteristics that shape corruption 
perception? We analyze the foundations of corruption perception in the case of Uruguay.  
 
Although there are very different definitions, it is possible to find some elements in 
common which are connected with the misuse of public office with the purpose of making 
private gains. This paper focuses on this wide concept of corruption.  
 
One possible explanation for corruption is based on the premise that rules are asymmetric 
and highly costly; therefore, corruption could be interpreted as a tax: people may pay 
illegal and informal taxes which allow them to avoid a rule, a penalty etc. The cost of the 
rule is a function of the lost in time and the information needed to fulfill it. Consequently, 
rules and laws modify the decision making process (Ghersi, 2006). Moreover, You et al. 
(2005) show that income inequality is a significant determinant of corruption. With the 
increased inequality, the rich, as a class or as interest group, can use lobbying, political 
contributions or bribery to influence law-implementing processes (bureaucratic corruption) 
and to buy favorable interpretations of the law (judicial corruption).  
  
You et al. (2005) argue that income inequality also influences corruption perception and 
habituates norms about corruption in the following way: if inequality is high, “the rich are 
likely to believe that corruption is an acceptable way of preserving their societal position as 
this behavior goes unpunished and social networks of corruption expand and people will 
more easily justify their corrupt activities as inequality increases”. 
 
Cábelková (2001) holds that the incentives to take corrupt actions are affected by 
individual perception about the level of corruption and the authority’s level of tolerance. 
Olken (2007) argues that the availability of information is relevant; he shows that 
providing audit results to the public, may be a useful complement to formal punishments  
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when voting. Therefore, corruption perception is shaped by individual characteristics such 
as education and the capability to analyze information. 
 
Corruption perception differs from the current level of corruption but the later may 
influence the former. According to Rose-Ackerman (2001) low salaries and poor 
monitoring at the public sector are not only incentives for corruption but also those facts 
hike corruption perception even when a corrupt action does not occur. The same is true 
when the bureaucracy may be charged with allocating a scarce benefit to many individuals 
or when the costs imposed on the private sector by governments are high. 
 
Our aim is assessing what are the most important determinants of corruption perception in 
Uruguay. This issue has not previously study for that country. In the period 2001-2004 
there were no press reports that mentioned relevant corruption scandals and Uruguay 
ranked higher in the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (to position 
28 from position 35 or to 6.2 points from 5.1 points). Hence, we analyze the foundations of 
people’s perception at the micro-level. We expect that socio-economic factors play a 
relevant role in shaping corruption perception in the case of Uruguay. For example, live-
course adjustments may be relevant as well as the capacity of analyzing the information, 
and beliefs. Therefore, age, education and religiosity may shape people’s corruption 
perception.  
 
The data source is the module on Citizenship of the 2004 International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP). The survey asks respondents (approximately 1.000) their opinions on a 
great variety of issues, including international trade, migration, corruption, politics or 
religion. In addition, it includes demographic and socio-economic data, such as: age, 
gender, education and others. 
 
Ordered probit models were estimated in order to study the impact of these variables on 
corruption perception. We conclude that there are socio-demographic variables which are 
significant at determining corruption perception, variables such us: religion, age and the 
level of education, among others.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section is theoretical in nature, and 
draw on the definition of corruption. Section three is devoted to the existing and well-
developed theory on the subject. Section four sketches the main features of the 
econometric methods applied in this analysis, the data source and the description of 




2.  Corruption: concept and general view 
 
Corruption is interpreted as cultural phenomena. The concept of corruption is employed in 
several areas and its connotations vary widely depending not only on societies but also on 
people. In effect, social rules may differ among cultures; while in one society an action 
could be accepted as normal in another one the same action could be a corrupt action.  
 
When assessing corruption perception, the first problem is arriving at a definition which 
lends itself to cross-cultural research. As we mentioned, this paper focuses on a wide 
concept of corruption: the misuse of public office with the purpose of making private 
gains; this definition incorporates the notions of wrongly getting an advantage, pecuniary 
or otherwise, in violation of official duty and the rights of others. Although all people have 
a definition of behavior labeled as corrupt, there might be cultural differences in the way 
"wrongfully" is defined by people. Consequently, there is need for a balance between the 
generalizations of this concept and the capability of explaining it in a specific historical 
context and culture in which it occurs.  
 
In economic terms, there are several ways to define corruption. For example, Werlin 
(1973) characterizes corruption as the use of public office for making private gains and 
Blackburn et al. (2004) consider public sector corruption as the illegal, or unauthorized, 
profiteering by officials who exploit their positions to make personal gains. Focusing on 
public sector, Shleifer et al. (1993), define it as the sale of state assets by civil servants in 
order to make private gains. 
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Pope (2000) asserts that corruption can take place where there is a combination of 
opportunity and inclination. He explains that corruption can be initiated from either side of 
the transaction: a bribe being offered to an official, or the official requesting an illicit 
payment. Those offering bribes may do so either because they want something they are not 
entitled to, and bribe the official to bend the rules, or because they believe that the official 
will not give them their entitlements without some inducements being offered. On the other 
hand, officials may refuse to serve clients unless a bribe is paid. In this case, it is possible 
to differ between small bribes practiced by civil servants and the great corruption of high 
public officials involving large and hidden bribes in overseas bank accounts.  
 
 
3.  Corruption perception 
 
Institutional stability hardly depends on corruption perception. It might favored not only 
the growth of instability but also the persistent deterioration of the relationships among 
individuals, institutions and States. The loss of political legitimacy that many governments 
have experienced, the polarization of power and bureaucratic inefficiency are some of the 
political consequences of corruption. Moreover macro-economic consequences of 
corruption are severe: it reduces investment and the rate of growth (Mauro, 1995); the 
provision of services such as education and health may be distorted (Mauro, 1997) and it 
alters public investment projects that could be easily manipulated by high-level officials to 
get bribes (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). 
 
Some previous studies analyzed the link between corruption and political systems. In 
general, it was found that democratic systems tend to reduce corruption. Olken (2007) 
argues that when people could vote, the available information may influence on the 
decision hence providing audit results to the public, may be useful. Montinola et al. (2002) 
held that political competition was posited to reduce corruption because the freedom of 
information and association limit the opportunities for corrupt actions (by helping with the 
monitoring of public officials). Rose-Ackerman asserts that a competitive electoral process 
can give politicians an incentive to reveal the untrustworthy behavior of their opponents 
and to be trustworthy themselves. As there are proofs regarding this relationship we will 
focus on the satisfaction with the democratic system rather than the democracy itself.  
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Additionally, Kim (2005) study the case of Korea and he find that associational 
involvement and social trust negatively influence political trust when demographic factors 
were taken into account. She also holds that political corruption is the most relevant 
determinant of political trust. Hence, we expect that the interaction with other people shape 
corruption perception.  
 
Corruption perception differs from the current level of corruption but the later may 
influence the former. Mauro (2004) find that when a high rate of people is stealing from 
the government, individual’s decisions would be based not only on a higher marginal 
product of stealing because the chances of being caught are lower and it will be profitable 
to allocate more time to rent seeking (and less time to productive activities).  
 
In line with the previous argument and considering cot-benefits analysis, Cábelková (2001) 
shows that the incentives to take corrupt actions were affected by corruption perception 
and the authority’s level of tolerance. Corruption perception may affect both the demand 
and supply of corrupt actions. She finds that the cost of legality is inversely proportional to 
an individual’s income: a higher income makes easier the access to information. In line 
with this, Ghersi (2006) shows that rules and laws have asymmetric effects, which distort 
individual behavior. 
 
When the fulfillment of a rule implies high costs, decisions will vary among individuals 
depending on their values and moral views, which modify the perception of the expected 
costs and expected benefits. Ceteris Paribus, to bribe would not mean the same to people 
depending on their values. While a person could be against bribery regardless of the 
perceived level of corruption someone else views could depend on the existing level of 
corruption. 
 
Additionally, the formation of individual perceptions about the level of corruption is 
affected by the access to information and the capability to analyze this information. 
Personal experience has a significant role; it depends on the interaction among the citizen 
and corrupts civil servants. Obviously, there are additional sources of information about 
corruption such as the media (radio, TV, written press) or information from relatives and 
friends.   
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As Cábelková (2001) indicates, the perception of corruption may influence the level of 
corruption in two opposite ways. When people perceive that the level of corruption is high 
it is likely that: 1) citizens think that a bribe is needed and 2) government employees do not 
consider that a bribe is improper. Hereby, a bribe is thought to be necessary and it seems 
unlikely that this bribe would not be accepted. In turn, government employees could 
consider this activity as risk-free and with low probability of detection. Therefore, 
corruption increases. On the other hand, when the perception of corruption is high, the 
government may take greater actions in order to reduce corruption. Therefore, corruption 
could decrease. 
 
Finally, corruption perception has favored the growth of institutional instability and the 
deterioration of the relationships among individuals, institutions and states. Moreover, the 
perception of economic corruption would have more devastating effects than corruption 
itself; it generates a “culture of distrust” towards some institutions.  
 
 
4.  Data source and methodology 
 
As mentioned, the data source is the module on Citizenship of the 2004 International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP).
1 The survey asks respondents their opinions on a great 
variety of issues, including international trade, migration, politics, taxes and corruption, as 
well as demographic and socio-economic information, such as age, gender, education, 
religiosity and others. 
 
The question used in the survey to identify respondent’s perception of corruption is: 
 
Taking into account your experience, 
how widespread do you think corruption is in the public service in Uruguay? 
 
                                                 
1 More information is available on ISSP website: www.issp.org.   
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The answers correspond to the following categories = 
 
0 if respondent answers “almost none”, 
1 if respondent indicates “just a few” or “some of them” and   
2 if respondent says “many of them” or “almost all”. 
 
Table 1 shows the weighted frequency distribution of the answers to this question. 
 
Insert Table 1: Answers 
 
Given this question, we constructed the dependant multinomial variable and consequently 
we estimate an ordered probit model. The model aims at determining how different 
individual characteristics affect the formation of opinions towards corruption among 
government employees.  
 
The description of the variables is reported in table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2: Description of independent variables 
 
The estimated parameters in ordered probit models do not provide direct information on 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Long, 2001). 
Substantive interpretations are usually based on the prediction of probabilities and 
functions of these probabilities. These predictions are made for different groups of 
individuals and the marginal effects of the independent variables are calculated. If the 
independent variable is binary, the marginal effect is the change from not having a 
particular characteristic to having it.  
 
With the estimation of ordered probit models, the impact of variables such as age, gender, 





5.  Results 
 
The ordered probit model is reported in table 3. As could be seen, all cuts are significant at 
1%. We calculate the marginal effects and their standard errors after estimation.  
 
Rather than reporting coefficients, table 4 reports the discrete change in the probability for 
each significant independent variable. The marginal effects are nonlinear functions of the 
estimated parameters, so they cannot generally be inferred directly from the parameter 
estimates.  
 
Insert Table 3: The model 
 
Insert Table 4: Partial effects 
 
As expected, life-course adjustments matter. The first dummy on respondent’s age is 
significant and due to positive sign we can conclude that youngest people are more likely 
to perceive a higher level of corruption than older people. Additionally, it was found that 
there is no significant difference among middle-aged people and the oldest group. It is 
often argued that more recent generations have been socialized in more troubled situations 
and more impersonal environments. This effect may be causing that young Uruguayans 
perceive a higher corruption level. 
 
Secondly, as it was also expected, the level of education makes a significant difference. It 
was found that people who have taken high school studies or a higher level tend to 
perceive a higher level of corruption (the probability increases 9.7 pp and 8.4 pp, 
respectively). Hence, the capability of accessing and assessing to information play a 
relevant role. 
 
Additionally, the sector of employment is determinant of corruption perception. Those who 
are working in a private enterprise are more likely to perceive a higher level o corruption 
than civil servants. In this case, the probability to perceiving the highest level of corruption 
also increases (7.1 pp). This result implies that those who may offer a bribe or may be 
asked for a bribe consider that corruption is higher than those who might request the bribe.   
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Regarding employment status, it is worth noting that those who are unemployed tend to 
perceive a lower level of corruption (due to the negative sign). In particular, the probability 
reduces 10.7 pp. On the other hand, union membership is not significant as well as there is 
no significant difference among those who are retired and others. 
 
Moreover, values and beliefs also shape corruption perception. When religious groups are 
considered, it was found that people who identify with some religious group are more 
likely to perceive a higher level of corruption than those who do not (the mentioned 
probability rose 8.2 pp). On the other hand, the degree of religiosity (measured by weekly 
attendance to religious services) does not influence the perception of corruption. 
 
The estimated model also shows that the interaction with other people plays a relevant role. 
The variable connected with the number of people with whom respondents interact daily is 
significant and registered a positive sign. This result implies that when we change from 
someone who interacts, diary, with less than four people to someone who interacts with 
more people, the probability increases 9.5 pp. 
 
Finally, regarding socio-demographic variables, it was found that gender is not significant, 
indicating that there is no significant difference among women and men. Some dummies 
variables representing different marital status were included but they are no significant as 
well as the variable on place of residence. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
We found that some economic variables have a significant impact on corruption 
perception. Those who are employed in the private sector are more likely to perceive a 
higher level o corruption than those who are employed in the public sector. Regarding 
bribes, this result implies that those that may be on the supply side perceive higher 
corruption that those on the demand side (civil servants). Moreover, those who are 
unemployed tend to perceive a lower level of corruption.  
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However, our main conclusion is that there are some non-economic variables which have a 
significant impact on corruption perception. Summing up, we found that life adjustments, 
education, beliefs and interaction with others play a relevant role and in the expected 
direction. 
 
Firstly, people who belong to the youngest group are more likely to perceive a higher level 
of corruption than older people. Secondly, the level of education matters, people who took 
high school studies or a higher level tend to perceive a higher level of corruption. Thirdly, 
regarding values and beliefs, while religiosity is not significant, it was found that people 
who identify with some religious group are more likely to perceive a higher level of 
corruption than those who are atheistic. Finally, the estimated model shows that the 
interaction with others plays a relevant role. This result implies that the greater the number 
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Annex – Tables 
 
Table 1 - Distribution of answers 
Taking into account your experience, how much is 
extended corruption among public employees? 
Categories Frequency 
Almost none  5,7% 
Just a few or some of them  59,3% 




Table 2 - Description of independent variables 
Area Variable  Values 
SCHOOL  1 if respondent took primary school 
HIGH_SCHOOL  1 if respondent took secondary school  
Human 
Capital 
UNIVERSITY  1 if respondent took university studies  
RELIGION  1 if respondent identifies with some religious group 
Religion and 
religiosity  RELIGIOSITY 
1 if the person attends religious services every week or 
more frequently 
MONTEVIDEO  1 if respondent lives in Montevideo  Place of 
residence  INTERIOR  1 if respondent does not live in Montevideo 
UNEMPLOYED  1 if unemployed  
RETIRED  1 if retired  
PUBLIC_S  1 if working in public sector  
PRIVATE_S  1 if working in a private enterprise  
IND_CTAP  1 if being self-employed  
Labor 
market 
UNION  1 if belonging to an union  
GENDER  1 being a woman  
AGE1  1 if respondent’s age is between 18 and 39 years old  
AGE2  1 if respondent’s age is between 40 and 60 years old  




MARRIED 1  if  married  or living as married   
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Area Variable  Values 
DIVORCED  1 if divorced  




1 if the number of people with who respondent interact 
daily is higher than 4 people and 0 in other case 
 
 
Table 3 - The model 










































Notes: 1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
           2. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at     
 1% level 
 
Table 4 - Marginal effects 
   GOV_EMP 
AGE1 0,110
   (0,063)
HIGH_SCHOOL 0,097
   (0,038)
UNIVERSITY 0,084
   (0,053)
PRIVATE_S 0,071
   (0,040)
UNEMPLOYED -0,107
   (0,051)
RELIGION 0,082
   (0,036)
CONTACTS 0,095
   (0,041)
Observations 927
  Notes: 1 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 